them to circumvent biodiversity patents held by LDC's. t6 Moreover, existing doctrines of equitable patent scope expansion may be inadequate to protect the proposed biodiversity patent rights. Fundamental modifications in our system of chemical patents may therefore be required in order to fulfill the aspirations of the Rio Convention.' 7 In any event, future patent infringement determinations must be informed by characteristics beyond mere literal chemical structure, and such determinations should be shifted to the Patent Office. While the changes proposed here are extensive, they have the potential to make pharmaceutical development more efficient and responsive to diverse worldwide needs as well as to encourage the conservation of our priceless biological inheritance.
I. THE Rio CONVENTION

A. The Text of the Treaty: "impressively opaque"?' 8
Like many modern multilateral treaties, the Rio Convention makes clear its goals but not the means to implement them.' 9 Its aspirational values are clear enough: the Preamble emphasizes the value of the conservation of biological resources 2 " as well as the need to share fairly the profits arising from these resources.
2 ' The Convention therefore seeks the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.2
The Convention becomes more specific-and more worrisome to the giant pharmaceutical concerns that lobbied against its ratification-in Article 15, which recognizes states' sovereign rights over their natural resources, including 20. Rio Convention, supra note 13, at 822. 21. Id. The Preamble also stresses the precautionary nature of conservation attempts: given the lack of knowledge concerning the potential value of these resources, the Convention errs on the side of conservation.
22. Id., art. 1, 31 I.L.M. at 823.
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"the authority to determine access to genetic resources."3 Article 15 requires signatories to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that the results and benefits of research utilizing genetic resources are shared fairly with the nation of origin. 24 Although Article 16 emphasizes the need to establish access to and transfer of genetic-resource technology among Western and LDC countries,' it fails to propose a regime to assign the resulting intellectual property rights. 26 Article 16 does acknowledge the continued existence of intellectual property rights in this technology. 27 
B. The Convention in Context
A worldwide system of patent rights in genetic resources would achieve the goals of the Rio Convention. A look at earlier attempts to create international schemes of intellectual property rights in natural resources provides a useful gloss on the Convention's terminology, and also illustrates why such patent rights must be provided if the Convention is to achieve its goals. Most conflicts over intellectual property rights in natural genetic resources have concerned varieties of food crops, rather than the relatively obscure area of pharmaceutically-valuable phytochemicals. 8 Conflicts concerning food crops surfaced during the enactment of the United States Plant Varieties Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA) 29 and came to a head over the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources of 1983 (FAO Undertaking). 0 The plant varieties protected by the PVPA do not include the products of traditional breeding efforts, which are not considered novel. Therefore, the PVPA favors Western agricultural breeders over LDC breeders. The PVPA allows commercial protection for any new species, even those that reproduce 23. Id., art. 15, § 1, 31 I.L.M. at 828. 24. Id., art. 15, § 7, 31 I.L.M. at 828. 25. Genentech, Inc. and other biotechnology companies fear that Articles 15 and 16 would turn "technology transfer" and "equitable sharing" into compulsory licensing and intellectual property expropriation. Article 16 requires that developed nations ensure that their "private sector facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of technology ... for the benefit of both governmental institutions and the private sector of developing countries." Id., art. 16, § 4, 31 LL.M. at 829. Biotechnology companies fear that this provision, together with the Convention's financing provisions, will allow developing countries to claim a portion of the proceeds from successful products retroactively, after the risky investment period of development has passed. Such claims would prevent the private sector from accurately predicting future returns from research projects that require enormous investments. U.S. Biotech Companies Leery of Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 11, at 13A.
26. Rio Convention, supra note 13, art. 
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sexually, 31 whereas the older Plant Patent Act of 1930 provides patent protection only for asexually reproducing varieties. 32 The usual subjects of plant patent protection are sterile hybrid lines, seed for which is produced by crossing two homogeneous sexually reproducing varieties at the seed manufacturer's facilities. The crop produced from such seed is generally sterile 33 and thus already protected from illicit copying, so long as the trade secrecy of the parent lines is maintained. The PVPA extended legal protection to new varieties that had no natural protection from copying, while excluding known varieties.
The transnational seed companies have argued that their advanced lines deserve to receive intellectual property protection because Western breeding utilizes more highly technical labor and the resulting products are exclusively sold as commodities.' Conversely, their position on expanding this protection to encompass raw germplasm, the genetic components of the great "natural" diversity present in (mainly) Third World crops, is that it should be considered the "common heritage of humankind," 35 the gift of nature to the present generation. Several arguments have been advanced to explain why these traditional breeders' lines should not be entitled to the same level of propertyright protection that the products of high-tech breeding receive. The most significant is the claim that a wild species (or its raw germplasm) is hard to value and thus hard to price, due to its indeterminate usefulness. Only after some experimentation, for example, would a breeder find out if genes for specific traits from a raw germplasm could be easily introduced into a successful line of its own that contained the bulk of desirable genes. A strict 33. Crop lines with sterile seed might seem to have limited commercial use, but in fact, high-tech farmers often prefer the predictable features and yields produced by genetically homogeneous hybrid seed. The sterility of the resulting crop is counter-balanced by the benefits of uniformity. High-tech farmers often buy all their seed from a breeder, who benefits from this dependable market.
34. This commodification of the seed is a relatively new phenomenon: [Seed trade] lobbying has successfully eliminated varietal performance as a requirement for certification .... The key word... is not "yield" or "quality" but "choice." As one company executive put it, the "seed industry is and always has been a merchandizing industry. After all, we are only a few years away from the time that we all had the same public varieties to sell." KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 143 (quoting D. Kinsell). There are parallels here to the incipient commodification by multinational drug companies of naturally occurring pharmaceuticals, which the patent system has often but not always left in the public domain. See infra text accompanying notes 85-103.
35. MYERS, supra note 7, at 24; see also Garrison Wilkes, Current Status of Crop Plant Germplasm, 1 CRITICAL REVS. PLANT Sci. 133, 156 (1983) . The phrase "common heritage of mankind" first entered the international environmental law lexicon with Article 136 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1293, which declares the seabed and its resources the "common heritage of mankind." The Convention on the Law of the Sea also emphasizes the opposition between its "common heritage" approach and a system of "sovereignty or sovereign rights" over these resources. Id, art. 137, 21 I.L.M. at 1293. The former precludes the latter.
[Vol. 103: 223 regime of intellectual property protection might lead to the undervaluation and/or underutilization of raw germplasm sources for genetic traits. Another argument relies on the fact that Western commercial lines involve valuable input of technical labor, which should be rewarded with legal protection under a labor theory of property rights. By contrast, raw germplasm is only valuable after the introduction of technical labor allows incorporation of the genetic material into a new commercial line. 36 This argument neglects the millennia of farmers' labor invested in quite effective traditional breeding practices.
Nonetheless, in 1983 most LDC's endorsed the FAO Undertaking and thereby accepted the idea that traditional breeders' lines should not receive the protection afforded to commercial breeders' lines. The Undertaking strove to produce a system of seed banks around the globe that would contain all of the land races 37 of the underdeveloped world as well as the advanced lines of the industrialized agricultural world. These seed banks would be open to any breeder who needed to draw from them.
Minority voices in the underdeveloped and socialist worlds argued that they had little to gain from such an arrangement. They contended that the Undertaking offered a vast storehouse of diverse genetic material from the underdeveloped "South" in exchange for genetically narrow lines of greater technological sophistication but dubious utility from the industrialized "North." The advanced nations would therefore lose little in the Undertaking bargain, because recognizing all lines as the "common genetic heritage of mankind" would still leave them in a better financial and scientific position to take advantage of a now larger and more easily accessed gene pool. This arrangement would, in fact, cater more to the West's commercial stake in maintaining diversity 38 than to the LDC's pressing need to raise capital for the production of agricultural technology suited to their needs.
9
36. On these arguments generally, see Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 8, at 188-92, and KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 184-89. Another argument claims that no "resource degradation" occurs with germplasm exploitation, as it would with depletable natural resources, since one seed contains the entire genetic code of a native strain in a useful (reproducible) form. But this proposition is equally true of all forms of intellectual property. See, e.g., Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights and the Protection of Plant Genetic Resources, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 5, at 293, 303-04.
37. In the literature on biological diversity, the term "land races"is used to refer to actively cultivated crop varieties that have been developed in traditional agricultural systems through both natural and human selection. WrrT, supra note 31, at 23.
38. Genetically, Western crops tend to be very homogenous. This lack of genetic diversity deprives them of collective resistance to epidemiological disasters like the Irish potato famine of the mid-nineteenth century, the U. 39. Continued dependence on the North's agribusiness to produce this technology would only deepen the South's technological dependence on the North, facilitate further devaluation of genetic factors with the creation of a one-way market, and reinforce the already divisive social differentiation among peasant producers.
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The Yale Law Journal A number of academic sociologists 4 ' and a decided minority of LDC specialists 4 ' have argued that a system of national sovereignty in genetic resources would better suit the needs of Third World agriculture. Such a system would take the form of intellectual property rights held by the governments of the LDC's in the name of the generations of farmer-breeders responsible for their diversity and continued existence. National elites in the LDC's might still reap the direct gains from such a system of property rights, but even these gains could lead to long-term societal benefits, according to dependency-theory models, by facilitating the development of basic scientific research in LDC's geared towards their specific agricultural needs. 42 This system would allow effective protection of hybrid strains, which would be impossible under the Undertaking without special exemptions. 43 Given the differences in the agricultural systems of the North and the South, a regime of natural-resource rights might result mostly in payments between LDC's, rather than from developed countries to LDC's, but the development of basic science in the LDC's is a crucial step in eliminating the wide qualitative gap between the agricultural systems of the North and the South. The FAO's 1983 position opposes any such system of national sovereignty in plant genetic resources. Its equivalent in the pharmaceutical field is the minimalist policy of refusing to recognize any patent rights in this area, a policy followed by many LDC's. 4 Given that the signatories of the FAO Undertaking-the majority of them LDC's-rejected proposals concerning national sovereignty in plant breeders' rights in 1983, 45 one might wonder why patent rights should be the preferred protective remedy under the Rio Convention. The Convention's vague wording, standing alone, might lead us to believe that it should be interpreted according to the free-exchange policies encouraged by the Undertaking. 46 this reading, the Convention promotes the selective transfer from the North of technologies covered by patents in those countries, in exchange for access to the genetic resources of the South. These contractual exchanges would be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. LDC governments would presumably negotiate with the appropriate transnational corporations for the initial release of the materials and would then leave subsequent protection in the hands of the corporations. 47 A reading of the Convention in light of the debate that surrounded and followed the Undertaking, however, produces a different interpretation. Nowhere in the Convention is the phrase "common heritage of mankind" used to describe biodiversity resources. Though the Preamble affirms "that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind, ' 4 the insertion of the term "concern" evokes duties accompanying rights, rather than a preference for free and open use. In fact, a general emphasis on rights throughout the text contradicts the assertion that the Convention is hostile to all constraints on the free exchange of germplasm. Rather, the Convention's repeated reference to the "sovereign rights of States over their natural resources" 49 must be read as a reference to the language of the Undertaking minority and their academic supporters. The recent history of this phrase allows no other interpretation. Establishing "sovereign rights" over natural resources is the opposite of treating them as the "common heritage" of humanity. 50 The language of "sovereign rights" was so strongly associated with the program of the Undertaking minority that its use by the drafters of the Rio Convention can only be understood as endorsing a system of national intellectual property rights in biodiversity resources. in genetic resources." Effective conservation requires long-term redistributive strategies for the development of LDC economies. Under an Undertakingstyled scheme, however, with no patent protection for biodiversity products, only contractual arrangements with transnational corporations will be available to allow LDC's to exploit these resources financially. The valuation objection to protecting raw germplasm-that its indeterminate usefulness makes it difficult to value in advance 52 -should lead to an undervaluation of this natural resource given the greater bargaining power of the richer, more developed countries. A property right-such as a patent-allows its holder to accept the risk that its value will change over time. Patent rights would give LDC's the freedom to wager that their biodiversity resources will become more valuable over a longer time horizon. Denied this alternative, LDC's will be forced to accept the lower up-front offers a contractual natural-resource exploitation agreement brings. Above these problems looms a more practical one: contractual regimes to protect intellectual property rights are easily circumvented, especially when not every player is a party to the contract. Given their generally inadequate law enforcement resources, LDC's may be unable to prevent companies from smuggling out samples of biological material. Furthermore, competing pharmaceutical companies may simply "steal" from each other. Most natural products are not patentable and may be freely copied by the competitors of a company contracting with an LDC. 53 This threat almost certainly serves to lower the value of the deal to the contracting LDC.
II. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PATENT RIGHTS
So-called "chemical prospecting" contractual agreements, which appeared on the scene at the same time as the Rio Convention was being negotiated, illustrate the problems inherent in pure contractual regimes. 4 Perhaps spurred on by deforestation or by a desire to affect the course of the Rio negotiations, at least two U.S. drug companies, Merck & Co. and Shaman Pharmaceuticals, have contracted with Latin American nations to gain access to virgin biological raw material in exchange for a share in the profits from any resulting products. Both companies intend to file patents on influenza and herpes antiviral agents derived from native plants. Shaman, a small start-up operation with a nonprofit 51. The Bush Administration, it should be noted, seems to have read the treaty this way: "The White House argued that this language [calling on countries to share 'in a fair and equitable way' the results of biochemical research, Rio Convention, supra note 13, art. 15, § 7, 31 I.L.M. at 828] eroded the patent rights of American companies that wish to study the flora and fauna that happen to exist in poor countries. 57 to the National Biodiversity Institute (INBio), a Costa Rican government organ. In exchange, Merck has received the right to exploit a limited territorial area for new drugs, with the cooperation of the government and of indigenous experts who will recover samples of medicinally useful plants that INBio will then forward to the company." Merck will retain patent rights to products developed under this agreement. 9 From Merck's point of view, this contract to exchange genetic resources for a share of the profits from their exploitation is made less valuable by the fact that its "exclusive" right to exploit the samples sent it by the Costa Rican government can be undercut by other drug companies. Once Merck's product reaches the market, other drug companies could fairly easily determine the structure of the active chemical ingredient. 60 These competitors would then be in the same position that Merck had been in after it had processed the original plant samples to determine the structures of their active pharmacological agents. Moreover, because of the naturally occurring substance exception to patentability, 61 Merck might have no recourse to patents to protect the drug it had "exclusively" contracted to develop. Without a guarantee of exclusivity, enforceable only by patent rights accruing to one of the contracting parties, Merck would receive only a slight head start on its competitors in exchange for its prospecting fee and royalty payments. 62 57. The amount of this royalty has not been disclosed, but one report estimates that it is between one and three percent on any product developed. Pharmaceutical Companies Go "Chemical Prospecting" for New Medicines, supra note 6. Costa Rica promises that it will reinvest fifty percent of these royalties "in conservation." A Merck spokesperson, Jeff Goldstein, claimed in August 1992 that " [b] ecause there are so few [prospecting] agreements [,] it seems that [Merck's deal] is becoming a model." However, he added that screening in this way is a "high-risk venture," and that it is not known whether the company will find anything useful. Id.
58. Stevens, supra note 54, at Cl. These local experts are the "bushmasters" who collect medicinal plants for the shamans. A typical bushmaster in Belize earns anywhere from two to ten times the typical farmer's income. Id at C9. Insect samples are also part of the deal. See Coyle et al., supra note 51, at 5.
Pharmaceutical Companies Go "Chemical Prspecting "for New
Medicines, supra note 6; Graeme Browning, Biodiversity Battle, 24 NAT'L J. 1827, 1828 (1992). These patents, if approved, would be of the sort assigned to compounds that, while occurring in nature, were nonetheless previously unknown in their purified and isolated form and are therefore not subject to the exclusion from patentability of naturally occurring substances. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83.
60. The ease of reverse engineering chemical structures is the reason trade secret protection would be ineffective for maintaining the exclusivity of such contractual arrangements.
61. See infra Part InI. 62. It took Merck eighteen months to isolate its antiviral product from the natural raw materials. Stevens, supra note 54, at Cl. Once the finished product reaches the market, competitors would probably need only a few weeks to determine the chemical structure of the active ingredient by using advanced spectroscopic techniques like 2D-NMR (two-dimensional nuclear magnetic resonance). On 2D-NMR, see generally W. McFarlane & D.S. Rycroft, Multiple Resonance, 16 ANN. REP. NMR 293 (1985) . Simpler technologies (e.g., x-ray crystallography, mass spectroscopy, IR and UV spectroscopy, simple test reactions) can in combination also yield quick results given some idea of a structure with which to begin. In any event, the chemical structure of a pharmaceutical product must ordinarily be published. See 21 U.S.C.
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The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 223 value of this head start pales beside that of a seventeen-year monopoly on production and use. 63 The disparity between the potential value of any pharmaceuticals that might be developed as a result of this prospecting agreement and the compensation that Costa Rica would receive presents an economic problem that must be solved by any scheme to create incentives for conservation. The root of this problem is not the undervaluation of Merck's inventive effort. Merck's competitors will have made approximately the same effort to bring their competing analogues to market. Nor is the problem the undercutting of Merck's capital investment. If its antiviral makes it to market, Merck will have underpaid vastly: one million dollars is a small sum weighed against the finances needed to gain regulatory approval for a new drug; and the unofficial royalty figure of one to three percent is small by pharmaceutical industry standards, 64 even if all that has been gained is a jump on the marketing end. 65 Rather, the problem is that the total contribution to the general welfare made by the introduction of the drug into the market is being undervalued. It is the LDC's natural resource, the knowledge of the structure of the drug, that is thereby undervalued. The conservation goals of the Rio Convention would be more effectively fulfilled if the LDC's property rights were broad enough to extract the full economic rents from those who benefit from its genetic resource. The LDC should have some form of patent right extensive enough to cover the entire value that the contracting pharmaceutical producer-and any free-riding competitors-gained from the discovery.
§ 355(/) (1988).
Once a competitor has determined the chemical structure, it has to perfect a laboratory synthesis. The time scale for this would probably be slightly longer, perhaps a few months for a moderately complicated molecule. The bulk of the lead time advantage accruing to Merck would come from this delay if the competitor's proposed product were allowed to benefit from the safety and efficacy testing results accumulated by Merck; the latter process ordinarily takes several years, but under the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, the process is greatly accelerated if the product being tested is shown to be "bioequivalent" to a pharmaceutical that has been already approved but is no longer on patent. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1988) (defining patent infringement in relation to FDA testing data). Bioequivalent drugs are basically generic-brand versions of previously approved products, equally potent and absorbed into the bloodstream at the same rate. They "are not required to replicate the extensive clinical trials that have already been used in the development of the original, brandname drug," but rather only need satisfy the lesser conditions for approval of "abbreviated new drug applications." Jeffrey Yorke, FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Sept. 1992, at 11, 14.
63. Of course, the value of any patent depends upon its scope. In the pharmaceutical industry, a competitor may be able to circumvent the seventeen-year monopoly on the production and use of a patented drug by creating a semisynthetic analogue to that drug. The second half of this Note addresses the thorny issues of patent scope that are raised by this practice. See infra Parts II-IV.
64. See supra note 57. The typical royalty range for undeveloped drug products is two to four percent, and not all biodiversity products will be so risky. Victoria McNamara, Researchers Cash in on Biotech Laws, HOUSTON Bus. J., July 3, 1989, § 1, at 1.
65. This lead time can, however, be extremely valuable. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 66. This argument turns on a use-value determination which, like all use-value determinations, is difficult to pin down empirically. Since synthetic pharmaceuticals are much more expensive to bring to market than phytochemical pharmaceuticals, it may be safe to assume that the cost of producing an acceptable substitute sets a very high upper limit on the rent-seeking activity of such LDC resource monopolists. Such valuations involve "the complex types of preferences involved when one is dealing with Of course, the disparity between the ex ante payments to the LDC's by the prospecting companies and the returns generated by the rare "find" may be seen as a form of insurance payment, working to protect individual LDC's from the possibility that their phytochemical harvest will produce only valueless duds, while some other countries' plants will bear the few viable drugs found in a given year. 67 In exchange for the bargain, the transnational drug company assumes this risk, which it may be better equipped to bear than an impoverished LDC would be. The skimming of economic rents from these resources by transnational corporations might be thought to be justified by their assumption of this risk; in fact, such contractual exploitation arrangements, while having a lower overall value to the LDC resource "owners," may in fact fit better into the equitable redistributive scheme envisioned by the Rio Convention, since a larger number of LDC's would be assured of a more regular stream of income. Given the blockbuster-oriented nature of modem drug development, income regularity is a plausible concern. 68 However, this arrangement also transfers the initiative from the resource holder to those on the marketing end, and it could also redistribute conservation funds to some nations whose resources might be less worth saving. Moreover, a collective national property scheme involving risk-spreading among several LDC's could accomplish the same goals. 69 All things considered, a deal as one-sided as Merck's appears to be the result of a severe imbalance of bargaining power: the enormous wealth of a multinational corporation matched 'against the enormous financial need of a developing nation for preserving biodiversity and for developing its own pharmaceutical industry. . This is the origin of the dilemma presented by attempts to put an economic value on biodiversity.
67. Given ex ante valuation problems of this type in voluntary contractual agreements, biotechnology companies' worries are understandable. They fear that the Rio Convention, especially Article 16 and its "equitable sharing" provisions, will allow LDC's to claim a portion of profits retroactively, after development of the drug has progressed to the marketing stage and the attendant huge capital commitment has already been made. 69. Rights could be assigned to multinational LDC organizations like the Andean League, to multinational economic organizations, or to one of the bodies spawned by the Convention itself. Article 16 of one proposed draft of the Convention apparently contained an explicit option to establish a specialized unit to collect specimens, to evaluate commercial applications of the collected specimens, and, finally, for the Secretariat to apply for intellectual property rights over any discoveries or inventions arising from such evaluations. Royalties would be invested in a fund for preserving biodiversity. These rather paternalistic proposals of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) were eventually rejected. [Vol. 103: 223
The great difference in value between arrangements for exploiting biodiversity resources which are founded on property rights and those which are not will make the patent (property rights) model far more effective in implementing the redistributive goals of the Rio Convention, at least over the long run. A system based on the patent model would provide the sovereign" within whose territory the biodiversity resource is first found with patent-like rights, 7 " that is, with exclusive rights to enjoin use for an arbitrarily fixed term. 7 " The goal of the system would be to improve the bargaining position of underdeveloped resource holders against the wealthy transnational companies that have the expertise and capital to develop those resources. Exclusive ownership of intellectual property rights would allow LDC's to extract the full economic rents for their resources from the transnational drug companies, which would either have to pay near-monopoly prices or go through the expensive and risky process of creating a synthetic substitute for the natural biodiversity pharmaceutical. At the same time, a drug company could protect its investments in specific biodiversity research by negotiating an exclusive licensing agreement with an LDC that would allow the company to enjoin its competitors from using that genetic resource. Under such a property-rights system, market mechanisms would assure the bargaining position of LDC's without any need for a paternalistic bureaucracy to oversee the resulting licensing arrangements. 73 Creating such rights on an international 70. The rights could also be held by a group of sovereigns, or by sub-sovereign groups, e.g., indigenous peoples whose collective ethnobotanical knowledge is used to identify useful species. Also, these "patents" need not be limited to LDC sovereigns. Certainly, biodiversity resources do exist in developed countries and will be exploited; the Clinton administration recently created a domestic biological survey project in the Department of the Interior. As It Signs Treaty, United States Calls for Global Protection for Biotech, supra note 12. This is not problematic to a biodiversity patent scheme; attaching value to biodiversity resources will encourage their conservation wherever they are.
71. In the United States, this type of biodiversity "patent" system might be subject to constitutional attack as granting patent rights to a non-inventive product. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the proposed regime could be implemented via a distinct statute that adds restrictions in order to differentiate the right granted from patent rights, as with the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § § 360aa-360ee (1988); see also Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 304-05 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting that Orphan Drug Act covers unpatentable products). Such a statute could clearly state that the system is being established pursuant to the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, rather than the Copyrights and Patents Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72. Because the tropical species relevant for chemical prospecting tend to be restricted in range of habitat, the entire population of a species providing a useful chemical will often be confined within the borders of one country. E.O. Wilson, supra note 9, at 1I. The reasons why these species are less dispersed than their temperate counterparts are discussed in Richard B. Norgaard, The Rise of the Global Exchange Economy and the Loss of Biological Diversity, in BIODIVERsrrY, supra note 9, at 206, 209, and in Therustrom, supra note 1, at B6. Whether or not these chemicals would occur in an unrelated plant species elsewhere is a different question, the answer to which will probably vary depending on how distinctive the chemical structure in question is.
73. Neither less developed countries nor pharmaceutical companies relish the prospect of a supervisory bureaucracy; faced with this alternative, both would prefer a property-rights system. Underdevelopment theorists support property rights as an effective vehicle for encouraging autonomy in the rights holder. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 771 (1964) . As for the pharmaceutical companies, in the days prior to the Rio Summit one executive was quoted as saying that, while he had not come across any opposition from drug manufacturers to paying royalties to countries for successful drugs derived from their plant species, . . . [t]he great concern is that [once the scale would, of course, require the municipal legal systems 74 of the participant nations to manifest a genuine commitment to protecting rights in biodiversity natural resources, as well as a genuine commitment to strong intellectual property protection generally. 75 Whether the patent system of the United States can provide biodiversity patents with strong intellectual property protection is the question the remainder of this Note will address.
III. THE NATURAL PRODUCTS EXCEPTON: HAS IT ALREADY PREPARED
FIRMS TO CIRCUMVENT A BIODIVERSITY PATENT SYSTEM?
As it exists today, patent law in most nations excludes from patentability all "products of nature, 76 including chemical structures. Overcoming the obstacle this poses for effective biodiversity patents requires more than adding a new exception to an exception, because the traditional exclusion has prompted pharmaceutical companies to develop strategies to evade the unpatentability of products of nature. These same strategies may also have prepared drug companies to undermine the effectiveness of the biodiversity patents proposed here. This Part begins with an analysis of the naturally occurring substance exception in current patent law. It then examines the "semi-synthetic" methods that pharmaceutical companies already use to evade the spirit of this exception, methods that these companies could potentially use to undermine the spirit of a Rio scheme as well.
convention becomes formally operational] a horrendous bureaucracy will emerge. The result will be that if a company wants to move germplasm out of the country there will be so much form filling and red tape that the exercise will not be worthwhile. Biodiversity Treaty May Restrict Commercialization, BIOTECHNOLOGY Bus. NEWS, July 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BIOBUS File.
74. The transnational patent system, to the extent that it exists at all, is the product of convergence between the municipal patent systems of individual nations, a convergence often motivated by external economic coercion in the form of trade sanctions. (The genuinely transnational system established by the European Patent Convention is one exception.) The two major transnational patent institutions are the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr). The United States, having found WIPO ineffectual in aiding its past efforts to strengthen intellectual property protection worldwide, has generally sought to use GAIT as a vehicle for harmonizing world patent systems. The Swiss proposed using GATr to enforce standards established by WIPO, but U. 76. The terms "product of nature," "naturally occurring substance," "natural substance," etc., are used synonymously.
The patent laws of most nations distinguish "between 'discovery' and 'invention' and exclude mere discovery from patentability. ' 77 Simply isolating a chemical substance from nature is usually considered unpatentable "discovery." When pharmaceutical companies discover a useful chemical in nature, they often find it more convenient to produce the same substance in marketable quantities through synthetic means. 78 However, a synthetically produced chemical with the same structure as a natural compound is generally not patentable. In a leading nineteenth-century case that is still good law, the Supreme Court held that a product differing from a substance occurring in nature only in that it is synthetically made does not meet the test for novelty and is therefore unpatentable. 7 9 This rule permits an exception: if the product was "previously unknown in its purified and isolated form," it may be patentable as a substance, not just as a purification process. 80 This exception continues to hold despite the relative ease of most modem purification and isolation processes. Artificially created substances of such higher purity that they "differ not only in degree but in kind" from the identical known natural substance are patentable."' The leading case in this area concerned claims for crystalline vitamin B 12 , 82 which does not exist in nature because B, 2 crystal structure is undermined by the slightest impurities. At the patented purity level the product is medicinally useful. To qualify for this type of purification patent, the level of purity should ideally be high enough to allow the product to be distinguished "in kind" by the words of the patent claim-here, conveniently, the product could be described as BI 2 in crystalline form. In addition, the transformed product must demonstrate "unexpected properties. 
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Plants, Poverty, and Patents Pharmaceuticals derived from the plant sources that the Rio Convention aims to protect are unlikely to meet the conditions for patentability in the present system. Since most of these phytochemicals will have been discovered in a plant already known to be medicinally useful (e.g., by native experts in the Merck prospecting agreement), the purified or synthetic pharmaceutical would have to show some qualitative leap in clinical efficacy in order to qualify for a patent under the "unexpected properties" condition.
Precisely because it has been so difficult to obtain patents on synthetic (and therefore mass-producible) versions of naturally occurring pharmaceuticals, the practice of adding small modifications to the chemical structure of the original compound has become widespread.' M This process typically involves discovery of the natural compound's chemical structure and the laboratory synthesis to duplicate it. Through a process of trial and error, the patent-seeker then tries to create a "new" chemical that has a slightly different structure but duplicates the beneficial effects of the original.
Three possible explanations account for the pharmaceutical industry's extensive use of this practice. The first is that structural modification of known metabolites has historically been an effective strategy for developing new drugs.' Antibiotics, for example, are often found in nature in an unstable or otherwise therapeutically useless form, which slight chemical structure modifications may convert into a more potent version. 86 The new compound, if not itself known to be naturally occurring, is-and should be-patentable. Apparently slight structural modifications can also sometimes produce radical changes in the clinical effect of a known metabolite. Steroids are a frequent target of this sort of research, since all the members of this huge class of hormones are based on a common four-ring carbon framework.
Although drug companies may want to claim that a search for "superior biological properties" underlies all aspects of their research, two other explanations lead to the conclusion that such practices are of more dubious social utility. The peculiarities of marketing in the pharmaceutical industry often justify the development of look-alike chemical analogues to existing drugs, despite the huge cost of obtaining regulatory approval for the new variants. Modifying old top-sellers can allow for niche-marketing in profitable and competitive fields, such as tranquilizers. 8 7 Incremental improvements may 84. Sometimes the following difficulty is encountered:
[N]aturally occurring chemicals can not be patented once their structures have been published. Active compounds that are discovered and characterized by university researchers are often published in scientific journals before patents are granted. Drug companies are then forced to spend time and money finding novel derivatives with the same effect, so they can patent them. by giving the new versions related marks. These strategies are of significant benefit because the drug business is so marketing-intensive: some 20-25% of drug company revenues go into advertising. 8 9 For this reason, firms "often rush a product to market in order to be first with it and then replace it later" with a more refined relative.' The publicity accruing to technological advances in the medical field and the head start on establishing trademark recognition benefits the product. In the long run, trademark recognition is often the most valuable intellectual property right a pharmaceutical company obtains in a breakthrough drug. 91 Finally, the desire to evade the product-of-nature patent restriction motivates much of this research. The huge cost of securing FDA approval for a new pharmaceutical compound increases the risks of trying to market a new but non-patentable naturally occurring drug. The effort and delay involved in finding a "novel" derivative with the same effect is often worth the trouble, because this marketed version, and the huge investment required for safety and efficacy testing, can be protected by a patent. 92 One recent example of this phenomenon involves the drug lovastatin, which blocks the body's synthesis of cholesterol. Lovastatin represented a breakthrough in the control of 88 . Id. at 45. 89. Chudnovsky, supra note 10, at 190. This phenomenon is statistically obscured, as "development" takes an ever-increasing share of "research and development" investment dollars. JAMES, supra note 3, at 81. Nonetheless, industry-wide, "overhead and promotion budgets... amount to 25% of sales, vs. R&D's 16%." John Carey et al., A Bitter Tonic for Drugmakers? BUS. WK., Mar. 8, 1993, at 84, 84.
PRADHAN, supra note 4, at 45 (citing MICKEY C. SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MARKETING 133 (2d ed. 1975)).
91. All pharmaceuticals have a chemical name, which is an intricate formal description of the actual chemical structure in words (e.g., 2,4-pyrimidinediamine, 6-(t-piperidinyl)-,3-oxide), a generic name which is a shortened version commonly used by scientists in most writings (e.g., minoxidil), and a trademarked or brand name (e.g., Rogaine or, in Europe, the more descriptive Regain) for consumers, including doctors. See infra note 95 for another example. Advertisements to doctors tend to concentrate on the trademark names, because of their unlimited length of protection-by the time a drug reaches the market it may only have a few years remaining on its patent protection, often too short a period of time in which to recoup the investment made. Forty percent of all trademarks worldwide attach to pharmaceuticals and associated goods. Chudnovsky, supra note 10, at 190-92. In absolute terms, this covers 50,000-80,000 trade names; for 700 different drugs in the U.S. market there are some 20,000 trade names. Worldwide the average is 70 per drug. Aurelie von Wartensleben, Major Issues Concerning Pharmaceutical Policies in the Third World, in PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note 10, at 169, 170.
92. As of 1985, it cost an average of $94 million to prove a single drug safe and effective. JAMES A.
DUKE, HANDBOOK OF NORTHEASTERN INDIAN MEDICINAL PLANTS, at xi (1986). According to the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, the total cost of bringing a drug to market today is on average $231 million. Rovner, supra note 11. These costs are often cited as a reason for the lack of interest displayed by U.S. manufacturers towards biodiversity drug sources. See, e.g., DUKE, supra, at xi (citing the high cost as "one simple reason, if not the only reason, that the pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. prefer to come up with synthetic compounds which they can patent, even though the synthetic may be a copycat, template, or derivative of the naturally occurring compound").
hypercholesterolamia when it was discovered in 1980. 9 3 Over 8000 strains of microorganisms were tested in the search for a drug to block the enzyme HMG CoA from converting acetate into squalene, a key reaction in the synthetic route the body uses to manufacture cholesterol. 94 A fungal metabolite, lovastatin 95 (pictured in Figure 1) , was the first effective inhibitor of HMG CoA found. Lovastatin's function derives from the fact that its physical structure makes it attractive to the spot on the enzyme that ordinarily attracts its natural substrate, acetate. 96 Merck, the first to discover this characteristic of lovastatin, used a general knowledge of enzyme behavior to surmise what was later discovered to be true: that the dihydroxyl group (at the top of the molecule in Figure 1 ) was crucial to the "structural activity relationship" with the enzyme. 97 This meant that the lower end of the molecule could probably be modified slightly without destroying the HMG CoA-inhibiting effect. Merck added a methyl group 98 to this nether-end and called the "semi-synthetic" resulting compound "simvastatin" (pictured in Figure 2 ).
'
Merck has chemical structure patents on both drugs and has marketed them simultaneously since simvastatin's market introduction on January 13, 1992.1°° Bristol-Myers Squibb has also marketed an HMG CoA inhibitor 95. "Lovastatin" is the generic name, "Mevacor" the brand name/trademark, and "[la(R"),3c,703,8P3 (2S',4S'),8a[3]-2-methylbyutanoic acid 1,2,3,7,8,Sa-hexahydro-3,7-dimethyl-8[2-(tetrahydro-4-hydroxy-6-oxo-2H-pyran-2-yl)ethyl]-l-naphthalenyl ester" the chemical name. 100. Alice Cantwell, Merck to Introduce Drug to Lower Cholesterol Levels, J. CoM., Jan. 9, 1992, at 7A. Simvastatin illustrates the long time frame required to introduce a new pharmaceutical into the market: Merck had first filed the patent application for simvastatin in 1986 and had submitted the FDA New Drug Application (NDA) in October 1987, Merck Press Release, supra note 99, years before it began marketing the drug in 1992. It appears that the new level of purity of lovastatin was such that, for practical purposes, it did not "previously exist." (The fact that the fungus probably did not have an LDC source also makes this example somewhat less than perfect.) The patent claims that the microfungus involved in the 
IV. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF COPYCAT SUBSTANCES
Merck's patent on simvastatin's structure shows how easy it is to evade the naturally occurring product exception. Patents on drugs do not attach to the specific biological activity that they have-which is in any case very difficult to determine with anywhere near the certainty that we have in our determinations of chemical structures. Rather, patents attach to the exact chemical structure of the drug, allowing pharmaceutical companies to violate the spirit of the natural products exception, which is intended to preclude patent protection for mere discovery-that is, for simply finding something that exists in nature, without any extraordinary search. In our example, the essential discovery was that structures bearing the dihydroxyl head' 0 4 of the lovastatin molecule fit into the active site of an enormously complex enzyme, thereby inhibiting its natural function. Protecting this aspect of the discovery must be the goal of a biodiversity patent scheme if it intends to value accurately the contribution of these natural resources to the progression of science and to the general welfare. Lovastatin is therefore a model for the sort of original discovery whose contribution to welfare must be fully protected under the Rio
Melissa Shon, The Big Issue: Explosive Growth in Cholesterol-Reducing Therapies is Piquing Drug Finns' Interest and Unleashing Price
Competition, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Mar. 9, 1992, at SR36. Fear of igniting a patent litigation war often inhibits pharmaceutical companies from pursuing claims against their competitors when the stakes are small. Pravachol might be found to infringe on Merck's compounds if a suit were brought, but lovastatin itself might be found to fall under the naturally occurring substance exception in the course of this litigation. Since such cribbing is common in the pharmaceutical industry, Squibb might respond by suing on all of the patents it held which Merck had subsequently infringed. Given the marketing jump and free media attention Merck had with "Mevacor," it probably will choose not to pursue any claims of infringement for these reasons. Annual sales for all cholesterol-lowering drugs were projected to be $1.6 billion in 1992, with Merck's "Mevacor" (lovastatin) holding 61% of the market. Id "Pravastatin" (another name for Pravachol) is also a "natural fermentation product," i.e., it is manufactured by bacteria. See U.S. Patent No. 4,857,546. The same drug is marketed in Japan by Sankyo under the name "Mevalotin," a product of discoveries simultaneous with lovastatin's. Convention, whereas simvastatin is a model for the sort of de facto infringer which not only deserves no patent protection of its own, 5 but whose use should also be an actionable patent infringement under a Rio-inspired patent scheme. The remainder of this Note begins by exploring the three features of existing patent law that might protect a natural product's chemical structure patent from semi-synthetic pretenders. The first involves a special type of original claim, a "Markush claim," capable of encompassing within its literal scope the whole class of chemical structures to which the natural product belonged. The second is the doctrine of obviousness, which might permit rejection of claims for a copycat substance, if the state of knowledge in the field before its creation rendered it obvious. The third is the doctrine of equivalents, which allows an ex post extension of an original claim to encompass the area covered by a newer compound, based on an after-the-fact finding that the new substance performs the same practical function as the one first claimed. Unfortunately, each of these doctrines, as applied today, is inadequate to accomplish the goals of the Rio Convention. This Note therefore concludes by proposing some fundamental changes in the system of patents on chemical structures that could potentially provide full protection for the fruits of biological diversity.
A. Original Claims Utilizing Markush Groups
One way to preempt the copycat infringer problem is to state the original literal claim for the naturally occurring pharmaceutical as a "Markush claim" that includes all variants expected to share exactly the same utility. The Markush doctrine evolved in response to our patent system's now-defunct prohibition on the use of alternative .language in the wording of patent claims. For example, a claim on a new type of bottle could not list the material as "glass or plastic," but would rather have to use a single generic term that encompasses both.
1 0 6 However, there is often "no commonly accepted generic expression which is commensurate in scope with the field which the 105. Even if a copycat drug such as simvastatin were found not to infringe the original patent, it might still have no value without a distinct patent of its own, because a pharmaceutical company might not be willing to invest the capital needed for FDA testing, see supra note 92, without being able to rely on a patent to protect its product from literal copying. This assumes, however, that any semi-synthetic drug would have to go through a full new-drug application for FDA approval, and not the cheaper, abbreviated application process allowed for generic versions of old drugs whose patents have expired. See supra note 62. Although this seems likely under current law, any decision on this matter is subject to administrative discretion. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C) (1988 [Vol. 103: 223
Plants, Poverty, and Patents applicant desires to cover."' 0 7 In such cases, the applicant may use a "coined subgeneric group" to describe the elements he wishes to claim-for example, a chemical synthesis might be described as involving, at one stage, material selected from "'a group consisting of reactants x, y, and z.""
Markush claims for chemical compounds "routinely embrace minor variations on the basic structure the inventor [has] discovered. For example, a patentee might claim a compound of structure 'Atom 1-Atom 2-Sidegroup,' where 'Sidegroup' is defined in the claim as including either 'N-O-O-H' or 'N-H 2 ."" 0 9 In the lovastatin/simvastatin example, it might be useful to identify the discovery as the basic active structure common to the molecules (the dihydroxyl head), attached to any one of a group of sidegroups (inert tail ends). The primary difficulty with this solution is that the applicant would have to guess which species of broadly inert compounds could be expected to have no effect on the drug's basic (HMG-CoA inhibiting) function when attached to the core molecule, because seeking proof would delay the application for the patent, and thus the disclosure of the invention, until after tests had been conducted."
0 Several years elapsed between the discovery of lovastatin and the discovery of its very close analogue simvastatin-by no means an insignificant potential delay in the introduction of a breakthrough drug. In addition, the late 1980's saw the discovery of several other synthetic compounds which share the active part of the lovastatin structure and have similar in vitro activity, but differ radically in the structure of the lower part of the molecule.' Such radical differences are problematic for a Markushtype claim, since "[t]he materials set forth in the Markush group ordinarily must belong to a recognized physical or chemical class or to an art-recognized class."" ' The variety of inactive elements that could be substituted into the 110. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 107, § 715.03 (stating that priority cannot be obtained by claiming, subsequent to PTO review, a disclosed but unclaimed member of the Markush group, i.e., an element similar to those disclosed as part of Markush group at time of filing claim, but not actually included in that group). Guessing at the probable effect (or lack of effect, in this case) on the activity of proposed members of the Markush group may be difficult. "Markush claims must be provided with support... for each member of the ... group. Where the constitution and formula of a chemical compound is stated only as a probability or speculation, the disclosure is not sufficient to support claims identifying the compound by such composition or formula." Id. § 608.01(p). 
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The Yale Law Journal core lovastatin structure may be greater than our patent system is ready to allow within the scope of one claim.
B. Obviousness
The European Patent Office (EPO) employs an obvious desideratum test for rejecting patents on inventions that are "obvious to try.. '. 3 This, the English "Cripps test," applies to an invention when it is "for all practical purposes obvious to any skilled chemist in the state of chemical knowledge... that he could manufacture valuable therapeutic agents" by making the product claimed by the process claimed."' The first in the race to realize something "obvious to try" has not earned a broad legal monopoly."' Unfortunately, American courts do not acknowledge this logic, and therefore researchers sometimes file a U.S. patent application before the completion of all actual experimental work.1 6 Where a claim is part of a "logical progression from what has gone before," 7 as when a chemical structure differs slightly from a known structure in a manner thought to be unlikely to cause radical changes in the utility of the substance, the EPO finds inventiveness only if properties "flow from the structure in an unpredictable manner. Inventiveness is therefore a combination of a structure and an unexpected utility or degree of utility."" 8 In analogous American cases, a showing of "unexpected properties" has been required for patentability where a sufficient structural similarity exists. Sufficiency is determined by the patent examiner's view of whether "one skilled in the relevant chemical art [would have] the motivation to make close possess at least one property in common which is mainly responsible for their function in the claimed relationship, and it is clear from their very nature or from the prior art that all of them possess this property. While in the past [this test] was applied as liberally as possible, present practice which holds that claims reciting Markush groups are not generic claims .. .may subject the groups to a more stringent test for propriety of the recited members. Id.; see also id. § 803.02 (discussing "unity of invention," found to exist where the compounds listed "(I) share a common utility and (2) share a substantial structural feature disclosed as being essential to that utility"). In In re Schechter, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated the principle thus in the context of chemical structure claims: The Markush group is acceptable "where the substances grouped have a community of chemical and physical characteristics which justify their inclusion in a common group, and such inclusion is not repugnant to the principles of scientific classification." 205 F.2d 185, 189 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (emphasis added). Thus, a Markush group for lovastatin-type compound tail ends including "all alkyl groups shorter than four carbons," see supra note 98, would be acceptable, but one including all the many complex and unclassifiable inert substituents that would function probably would not. [Vol. 103: 223 relatives.., of the prior art compound(s)."" 9 If two compounds have a sufficient structural similarity, a prima facie case of obviousness is established-so long as some information in the prior art specifically motivates or suggests the changes.' Evidence of similar utility would merely add weight to this prima facie case. The motivation requirement makes it harder to establish obviousness in the United States. Here, a patent application may not be rejected as obvious simply because the claimed invention was "obvious to try." In In re O'Farrell,1 2 1 the court cited two situations it had in mind as merely obvious to try but not obvious under American patent law:
In some cases, what would have been "obvious to try" would have been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful. In others, what was "obvious to try" was to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.1 22 Although look-alike pharmaceuticals such as simvastatin will frequently be "obvious to try" in this sense, they will rarely be so "obvious" as to justify the denial of a new patent under the narrow American standard of obviousness, which applies only when the prior art allows one to predict the effects of specific structural modifications. However, the way in which any sort of structural modification will affect the utility of a pharmaceutical is hard to predict ahead of time,'23 since even small structural changes have been known to cause radical shifts in utility. As a result, obviousness will provide little protection for Rio-inspired patents on biodiversity resources against de facto infringement by copycat compounds. 
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C. Equivalents
The equitable doctrine of equivalents effectively extends patent rights to cover products that do not infringe upon the literal terms of the original patent claim but that nonetheless perform "substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result" as the patented invention.124 Under this standard, establishing the functional equivalence of "look-alike" drugs requires claimants to prove not only that the clinical effects of the drugs are identical, but also that the biological mechanisms triggered by them are the same. Sometimes courts infer such equivalence in biological activity from structural similarities.125 Unfortunately, even under the most generous standards of legal proof, it is difficult to establish that two different structures function by exactly the same mechanism, even when (as in the case of the lovastatin family and its inactive tail-end) information about the enzyme and substrate geometries reasonably indicates that a similar biological mechanism is at work. 126 Because the doctrine of equivalents may be used to expand the scope of the original patent monopoly retroactively, courts have traditionally tried to limit its application by relying on putatively objective standards, such as structure. As noted in the previous Section, the fact that tiny structural modifications have sometimes resulted in important pharmaceutical innovations may lead courts to err on the side of caution and to limit findings of equivalents.1 27 While devices such as Markush groups are useful for expanding the literal scope of a chemical structure patent, the doctrine of equivalents makes it 126. See supra text accompanying note 97. 127. Note that under this standard, a showing of any slight difference in clinical function would protect a claimed look-alike compound from a finding of equivalents. The court in In re Georges Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322 (C.C.P.A. 1980), found that a claimed anticancer agent, though structurally similar to a previously patented anticancer compound, was slightly more efficacious in causing remission in early clinical trials-53% of the patients went into remission, as opposed to some presumably lower number for the prior-art drug. This provided the "requisite utility" to overcome the obvious structural similarities and avoid a finding of equivalents. The court emphasized that the structural similarities did not make Jolles' compound prima facie obvious under the prior art. possible to expand the effective scope of a patent beyond the bounds of its literal claim. The extent of the effective expansion typically reflects the nature of the original invention.
12 8 Donald Chisum describes three categories of original claims: "pioneers, entitled to a broad range of equivalents; marked improvements, entitled to a substantial range of equivalents; and narrow improvements, entitled to a limited or no range of equivalents."' 9 A newly discovered compound occurring in nature should qualify as one of Chisum's pioneers "because, unlike new compounds produced through chemical synthesis, a newly discovered [substance] having a novel activity or 'function' could not have been 'predicted' or even contemplated prior to its actual discovery.'
30 Thus, pharmaceuticals derived from biodiversity resources should be entitled to a broad range of equivalents.
Two problems complicate the use of equivalents doctrine to protect an LDC's equitable interest in its naturally occurring pharmaceuticals from lookalike piracy. The first is judicial uncertainty concerning so-called "new or unknown equivalents." Under older cases, the term "new equivalent" applies to an invention which substitutes some newly discovered element, ingredient, or technology into the original invention without changing its utility or function. Traditionally, such "new equivalents" were held not to infringe a patent on the original invention, and their use could therefore not be enjoined under the doctrine of equivalents. 3 Under this traditional approach, the doctrine of equivalents would not protect the holders of biodiversity patents if semi-synthetic knock-offs were deemed to be non-infringing "new equivalents." More recently, however, lower federal courts have taken the opposite position: the fact that a newly created substance did not exist at the time of an earlier claim does not preclude a finding that the new compound is an infringing equivalent of the old. 32 The Supreme Court has declined to review Federal Circuit decisions that state the currently prevailing view that new technologies can constitute equivalents. 133 Thus, today the doctrine of equivalents probably could be applied to look-alike pharmaceuticals that are developed after a naturally occurring substance has been patented.
The second objection is more intractable, however, because it is directed against the entire doctrine of equivalents: since similarities between the structure and functioning of two related chemicals are always a matter of degree open to subjective evaluation," 3 the doctrine provides no clear limit to the post hoc expansion of a monopoly right originally granted for disclosure of a discrete discovery. To a greater or lesser extent, every finding of equivalents dispenses with the requirement of literalness for patent applications and extends monopoly protection to what is, in the view of the deciding court or administrative body, the non-literal substance of the original invention. In the words of Learned Hand, a finding of equivalents stretches the literal terms of a patent claim to "cover more than their meaning will bear."' 135 The doctrine of equivalents denies form in a field that is generally characterized by literal formalism.
These objections suggest that findings of equivalents should be limited to a select class of cases, even for the category of "pioneer" patents that includes most phytochemical discoveries. Under the "prospect theory" of patent scope developed by Edmund Kitch 36 and elaborated by Robert Merges and Richard Nelson,1 37 patents should be construed to have the broadest scope, and thus to be entitled to the broadest class of equivalents, when they cover inventions in fields characterized by the "discrete invention model."' 38 These types of inventions are "discrete and well defined," and, while the original breakthrough may be subject to piecemeal improvement, it is implicit that [the invention] does not point the way to wide ranging subsequent technical advances. It does not define any broad prospect.... For inventions and industries like these, while tight and broad control of a particular invention may enable a firm to profit handsomely, possession by that firm of a proprietary lock on the In these discrete invention fields-such as pharmaceuticals-new inventions generally do not appropriate prior art elements whole and, conversely, are rarely amenable to incorporation as elements of some other, subsequent invention. 40 In discrete invention fields, construing the scope of patents broadly-and therefore finding equivalents readily-provides a strong incentive for the creation of new inventions. At the same time, the broad scope of patents in these fields does not have the negative economic effect of discouraging work towards improvements on the breakthrough. This is because breakthroughs in a "discrete invention" field are usually amenable to incremental improvement that can be efficiently orchestrated by a single rights holder but are not amenable to incorporation in a wide range of subsequent inventions. In this respect, discrete invention fields stand in marked contrast to fields characterized by "cumulative invention," in which "advances build on and interact with many other features of the existing technology .... [Ilnventions may enhance some feature of a prior 'dominant design,' or they may be incorporated into subsequent inventions, or both.' 14 1 In fields in which cumulative invention predominates, it is unlikely that one firm, if given broad patent rights, could orchestrate the further development of an initial breakthrough as efficiently as the competitive market can. Narrow judicial interpretations of patent scope foster this kind of competitive market by sharply delimiting the monopoly granted to pathbreaking or pioneering patent claims. This type of market competition is unnecessary in discrete invention fields, because pioneering inventions in those fields usually cannot be incorporated into a wide range of subsequent inventions, but can instead only be incrementally improved in a manner that a single rights holder can orchestrate.
Thus, the post hoe expansion of patent scope through findings of equivalents is inefficient only in fields characterized by cumulative advances in technology, rather than by discrete invention. But most pharmaceutical advances resulting from phytochemical research are in fact insular discoveries that are not predictably related to future advances or improvements, and they therefore do not fit the cumulative technologies model. Because of "the complex and unpredictable relationship between chemical structure and function,"' 42 pharmaceuticals belong in the "discrete inventions" category. 44 These occasional departures from the discrete invention model may explain why courts seem to prefer narrow interpretations of pharmaceutical patent scope rather than broad findings of equivalents: construing patents narrowly and literally promotes a competitive market conducive to cumulative advances in technology. At the same time, the ease with which new chemical structure patents can be obtained for analogues of naturally occurring substances, as in our simvastatin example, is another consideration pointing in the same direction-away from the doctrine of equivalents as a practical way of protecting LDC rights in biodiversity pharmaceuticals.
D. Rethinking Chemical Structure Patents
The patent system as we have it today was really very little changed by the Patent Act of 1952; it goes back to a period when invention was largely mechanical, followed by an electrical era. In both, invention was chiefly of physical objects. The language and much of the judicial treatment of the statutes is geared to that sort of invention. When chemical invention became more frequent . .. a problem arose of fitting chemical invention into a mold of words and a habit of thinking that were not developed with it in mind. 45 The discussion to this point has shown the need for biodiversity patents to extend beyond mere chemical structure to their utility or clinical efficacy. Largely for reasons of clarity and convenience, American patents have until now attached solely to chemical structures. The supposed utility of a claimed chemical compound is only at issue when the patent is being reviewed. Once awarded, the right granted enjoins others from using the patented structure for any purpose, even a newly discovered one.
Though "chemical diagram" patent protection has been a historical fixture, the utility requirement for gaining a patent has not. Before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' (CCPA) decision in In re Bremner,' 46 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) enforced no "specific utility" requirement. "[A] patent was granted almost automatically on a new chemical compound without any showing of utility."' 4 7 The present utility requirement was discrete invention category, at least before "genetic revolution").
144. Manson,' did not deny the usefulness of these types of research tools but concluded that, as one commentator put it, "the potential reward in a basically untested chemical has become so enormous that . . a 17 year monopoly should not be granted until something more substantial is given in exchange than the disclosure that the compound exists.' 5 2
This line of thinking complements the more venerable new-use doctrine, which precludes patents for newly discovered uses of a compound that either has already been patented or is an unpatentable product of nature. 53 As In re Thuau states, the original patent holder for the compound is "entitled to every use of which his invention is susceptible.' ' 4 In Thuau, the applicant found that a patented leather tanning solution had a therapeutic medical value for treating cervicitis, but he received no rights from the Patent Office or the CCPA in exchange for his investigatory diligence. Later courts have sometimes deviated from the Thuau doctrine for new-use claims that are stated as process patents, 5 s allowing the first patentee broad and easily enforceable rights over the compound itself (i.e., its chemical structure), 15 6 while giving the second, new-use patentee the right only to "preclude others from using the chemical in the exact manner he has disclosed. He acquires no right to produce the compound, to sell it, or even to use it.' 57 The inequity of this system is obvious. "The first inventor ... discloses one use, yet is 'paid' for all,"' 8 for she receives a patent in the chemical structure of the compound. This sort of arrangement might be equitable for patents on machines, which are tailored by their inventors to be ideal for one type of use, but biochemical inventions usually function by mechanisms dictated by nature and little understood by their discoverers. The patent system in these cases ought to encourage the search for uses per se, and not for useful compounds as it does now.
Despite its inequity as a system for compensating human efforts,' 59 something resembling a structure patent is exactly the sort of protection needed for biodiversity chemical structures. An LDC should be able to control the exploitation of its biodiversity resources regardless of the purpose for which they are used. Biodiversity patents should therefore be interpreted to subsume all routine manufacturing processes leading to the chemical structure, as well as use rights over the traditional medicinal use. 60 At the same time, a drug company that uncovers a hitherto unknown use for an already patented, medicinally useful phytochemical could receive, in exchange for its investigatory effort, a patent on the specific use. It would then have the ability to contract exclusively with the LDC for the specific right to exploit that specific new use.
Replacing patents on chemical structures with patents for specific uses would not completely solve the Rio piracy problem, but it might help refocus infringement actions on utility. Under a Rio-inspired patent scheme, patents for uses and manufacturing processes would still refer to structures, but structure would not occupy the same central position in defining patent scope that it does now. Lay judges, notoriously unsure of themselves in patent cases, t6 '
currently resolve equivalents controversies conservatively because they focus almost exclusively on the literal claim of the chemical structure diagram. Use escape infringement by using a patented invention for a purpose not contemplated or disclosed by the patentee."). In these situations the first patent, on the chemical structure, is known as the dominant patent; the second, on the new use, is known as the subservient patent, or the blocking patent, since its holder may block the holder of the compound patent from using the compound for the newly discovered use. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 109, at 860-61. 158. Eggert, supra note 116, at 781. 159. Considering biodiversity resources as natural resources, however, this mode of compensation for their use is neither inequitable nor inconsistent with values embodied in other laws dealing with rights to such resources. Again, this is because biodiversity patents serve the "prospect function" of patent grants, not the "reward function." See Kitch, supra note 136, at 271-75 (describing patent system as method of resource allocation analogous to mineral claims).
160. Ideally, a synthesis for the structure would be relatively easy to devise and execute. If not, the LDC could be given rights in the extraction process only. VinbIastine, for example, eludes a complete synthesis; the drug is still harvested--today from cell cultures of the rosy periwinkle, but until recently from the leaves of the plant itself. MYERS, supra note 7, at 200; see also id. at 92, 107. The private sector could compete to produce a workable synthesis, and, with its first-medical-use rights, the LDC would still be in a good position to extract a high share of the rents from any resulting marketed product. [Vol. 103: 223 patents would demand more subtle boundary-drawing between inventions because they would highlight distinctions in utility rather than structure. 1 62
Of course, the scope of such "use" patents might be construed as narrowly as structure patents on pharmaceuticals are now. If the doctrine of equivalents does not develop sufficiently to cover look-alike piracy, a "distinct efficacy" requirement could be imposed on obtaining patents for new pharmaceuticals. Equivalents doctrine currently embodies a two-step test: newcomers are noninfringing either (1) if they possess a minimally distinct structure or (2) if, in the absence of a distinct structure, they demonstrate some unexpected utility-a distinct efficacy. The distinct efficacy test would require inventors to present more information in support of their claims for a new patent. This information would also elucidate the relationship between structural changes and efficacy changes. 63 According to the prospect theory of patent scope, this relationship would determine whether broad or narrow patent scope should be allowed with respect to the use patent on the senior drug. If the relationship between small structural variations and function were predictable, the older patents would be construed broadly, since the original firm could be counted on to develop the product efficiently without market competition. But, if small changes did produce surprising variations in utility, then a narrow judicial construction of the patent would promote maximally efficient competition in these areas, with their relatively unlimited potentials for discovery."
A distinct efficacy test might be implemented in a number of ways through the presently existing regulatory apparatus governing new pharmaceuticals. Most obviously, the PTO could require a patent applicant to demonstrate the distinct efficacy of its new pharmaceutical in order to satisfy the utility requirement of the Patent Act. 65 Before the early 1960's, when Congress 162. Eggert, supra note 116, at 788. 163. All evaluations of patent scope benefit from being reviewed "in light of later technological developments." Merges & Nelson, supra note 109, at 911. Our current system resolves hard cases through the ex post vehicle of litigation, rather than demanding a more rigorous examination of the initial application, which is usually granted in doubtful cases.
164. Such a system raises concers about the propriety of asking one party to provide expensive-toobtain data that might end up increasing the value of the opponent's property while producing no return for its originator. An administrative scheme to compensate the producer of data could be devised; such a scheme was upheld against constitutional challenge in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) . Because producing the data needed to obtain regulatory approval is expensive, see supra note 92, the expropriation of such data is a prime concern of the pharmaceutical industry-almost as great a concern as patent expropriation. 
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165. In Germany, a requirement that all patentable inventions display some "technical progress" over the prior state of the art was once part of the basic criteria of nonobviousness (called an "inventive step" in Europe). Wolfgang G. expanded the FDA's regulatory powers over the pharmaceutical market,' 66 a showing of utility was a significant requirement for obtaining a patent on a new pharmaceutical. 67 Since then, the utility requirement for patents on new pharmaceuticals has become substantially looser.'6 The PTO's current Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states that patent applications shall be examined "recognizing that other agencies [e.g., the FDA] ... have been assigned the responsibility of assuring conformance to the standards established by statute for the advertisement, use, sale or distribution of drugs."' 169 Of course, Congress has the power to rearrange these responsibilities as it sees fit and to instruct the PTO to require a showing of distinct efficacy before granting a patent on a new pharmaceutical. Alternatively, a distinct efficacy test could be made a part of the safety regulations administered by the FDA.
7 ' Unfortunately, while patent doctrines and the institutions that enforce them are similar across the globe, the national administrative systems that presently oversee the pharmaceutical industry vary greatly from country to country. As a result, regulatory solutions to problems of pharmaceutical patent scope may be difficult to implement in a uniform manner at the international level.
Any regime that eliminates structure patents or introduces a distinct efficacy test would increase the work of the patent office, the courts, or both. But within the field of laboratory chemical research, eliminating structure patents would "restore a balance between reward and contribution.''. And with respect to pharmaceuticals patterned on a protected natural structure, introducing a distinct efficacy test would force drug companies to decide whether they anticipate proving a new effect before they attempt to develop look-alike semi-synthetics. Thus, the distinct efficacy test would end the current wasteful, duplicative practice of pursuing variant structures merely for market positioning against competitors. When viewed abstractly, it is difficult to balance the long-term costs of losing biodiversity against the potential administrative and efficiency costs of a redistributive scheme that would allow LDC's to extract full economic rents from users of their biodiversity resources. Empirical research alone will not disclose the most efficient global approach to this problem, because the costs and benefits of any potential solution are dispersed over space and time and reflect incommensurate needs. Fortunately, this analysis of costs and benefits need not be undertaken in the abstract. The Rio Convention expresses the international determination that biodiversity resources are to be valued highly and that such resources should therefore be protected by patent rights. Having made this value determination, policymakers should also realize that it need not create unintended inefficiencies in the development of new pharmaceuticals, because a single rights holder, such as an LDC state with a Rio-inspired biodiversity patent, will be able to orchestrate further development just as efficiently as the market can. 173 Like the more familiar heuristic, hit-or-miss synthetic research, phytochemical prospecting tends to produce breakthrough drugs, discrete leaps forward in the state of the art. For both normative and economic reasons, these types of advances demand broad protective scope, and in other areas they often receive it. Unfortunately, existing patent doctrines usually give look-alike pharmaceuticals the benefit of the doubt. Obviousness, an ex ante concept, offers little protection to the scope of Rio-inspired biodiversity patents, especially in light of the judicial interpretation of this doctrine in the United States. The doctrine of equivalents is more promising, because it involves an ex post reexamination of the initial patent in the light of developments occurring between the first grant and the copying. However, the practical usefulness of the doctrine of equivalents is undermined by judicial reliance on subjective evaluations of "structural similarity," from which equivalent biochemical mechanisms are then inferred. 174 Decisionmakers could strengthen this doctrine by focusing first on the issue of utility or efficacy, rather than relying on structure to establish a prima facie case of equivalents.
